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 Introduction 
 　 While the North Korean nuclear problem was one of the major issues of U.S. 
foreign policy throughout the Obama Administration, it could not find any 
substantial solution to the problem.  The administration’s policy of “strategic 
patience” toward North Korea failed to achieve its primary goal of making 
Pyongyang move toward denuclearization because of its adherence to the policy 
of becoming a nuclear weapons state with long-range missile capability, some U.S. 
miscalculations about the intention and circumstance of North Korea, and China’s 
reluctance to pressure North Korea to give up its nuclear program.  When the 
Trump Administration was launched, it put the top priority of its foreign policy on 
addressing the North Korean nuclear problem because its policy makers perceived 
the communist country’s nuclear weapons development as an urgent national 
security threat.  The administration adopted a policy of “strategic accountability” 
centered upon economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure to deal with the 
problem. 
 　 Regardless of these U.S. policies and international sanctions, North Korea has 
rejected demands of the U.S. and the international community to abandon its 
nuclear weapon program.  Instead, the communist regime has adhered to its policy 
of becoming a nuclear-armed state with nuclear-warhead intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs).  Under this policy, Pyongyang conducted six nuclear tests, 
including a possible hydrogen-bomb test on September 3, 2017, and test-launched 
a number of ballistic missiles, including three tests of ICBMs in July and late 
November 2017.  To date, the new U.S. policy of strategic accountability has been 
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estimated to appear similar to the strategic patience policy in terms of some main 
elements.  Given no change in North Korea’s intention and policy, it is unclear 
how effective the policy of strategic accountability will be in addressing the 
North’s nuclear problem.  The purpose of this paper is to examine and compare 
North Korea policies of the Obama and Trump Administrations not only by 
interpreting them from the perspective of foreign policy schools of thought, but 
also by exploring their similarities and differences. 
 　 The direction and basic strategy of U.S. foreign policy have been affected by 
foreign policy schools of thought shared by each administration’s policy makers. 
John Hulsman defines a foreign policy school of thought as “a sub-ideology that 
can be directly linked to concrete policy preferences” on major policy issues.  It is 
directly related to political philosophy having policy implications which is shared 
by a group of policy makers.1  Patrick Callahan calls the term foreign policy logic 
and defines it as a “stripped down ideology or worldview” comprised of ideas 
about the country’s basic foreign policy strategy, its national interests, the 
interpretation of its power, and its moral duties. 2  In a general sense, a foreign 
policy school of thought or logic refers to as a belief system consisting of 
principles and basic ideas concerning a nation’s foreign policy direction, goals 
and means, and prescriptions for key policy issues.  According to David Skidmore 
and John Hulsman, the basic strategy and direction of U.S. foreign policy have 
been largely influenced by three foreign policy schools of thought since the advent 
of the post-Cold War era in the early 1990s: realism, neo-conservatism, and liberal 
internationalism.3  This study aims to explore and compare the U.S. North Korea 
policies of strategic patience and accountability mainly by interpreting them from 
the perspective of the three foreign policy schools of thought. 
 I:  U.S. Foreign Policy Schools of Thought 
 1．Realism 
 　 From the realist point of view, an important priority of U.S. national interests 
in the post-Cold War era is to retain its preponderance in power and security, 
while preventing the emergence of any challenging competitor or its allies.4 
However, realists do not give priority to moral or humanitarian values and goals 
 1.  John Hulsman,  A Paradigm for the New World Order: A Schools-of-Thought Analysis of 
American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 12. 
 2.  Patrick Callahan,  Logics of American Foreign Policy: Theories of America’s World Role 
(New York: Pearson/Longman, 2004), 4. 
 3. See David Skidmore, ed.,  Paradoxes of Power: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing 
World (New York: Routledge, 2016), 1 ― 12; and Hulsman,  Paradigm , 21 ― 77. 
 4.  Skidmore,  Paradoxes , 5. 
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of foreign policy.  While respecting the sovereignty of any other countries in 
foreign relations, they do not attach importance to the nature of their regimes or 
human rights situation.  Hence realists oppose a policy of regime change for 
democratization through military intervention, as in the case of the Iraq War, not 
only because it causes enormous human and material damage, but also because it 
undermines American prestige considerably.5  Realists define U.S. national 
interests narrowly.  They thus argue that the priority of American foreign policy 
should be given to achieving its selfish interests of enhancing national security, 
the preponderance of power, economic prosperity, and the stability of the 
international system. 6
 　 Realists emphasize military power as an ultimate means of ensuring national 
security.  However, they oppose the use of military force for any other purpose 
than national security.  In particular, they disapprove of military intervention to 
change the politics and society of other countries.7  Even if there is a serious 
security threat, realism prescribes diplomatic solutions first, rather than the use of 
armed forces.8  Realists favor an engagement policy based on carrot-and-stick 
diplomacy toward foreign regimes hostile to the U.S. In other words, in order to 
induce their policy changes and cooperation, obvious incentives, such as economic 
aid, regime security, and diplomatic recognition, should be accompanied by 
punitive measures of imposing pressure and sanctions in case of their rejecting 
cooperation.9 
 　 Realists advocate multilateral foreign policy, rather than unilateral one, because 
they perceive limitations of U.S. military power.  Therefore, mutual cooperation 
with relevant countries, especially American allies, is needed to initiate and 
implement a security policy to effectively cope with uncooperative or hostile 
nations.  Realists prefer the U.S. to work with its allies mainly because of reducing 
the security burden on it.10  However, they have a skeptical view of the power and 
role of international law and institutions in addressing major security issues facing 
the U.S.11 
 5.  Stephen Walt, “The Shattered Kristol Ball,”  The National Interest (September-October 
2008): 27. 
 6.  Callahan,  Logics , 41 ― 42. 
 7.  Walt, “Shattered,” 26. 
 8.  Kurt Campbell and Drek Chollet, “The New Tribalism: Cliques and the Making of U.S. 
Foreign Policy,”  The Washington Quarterly , vol. 30, no. 1 (Winter 2006/07): 196 ― 97. 
 9.  Richard Haass, “Regime Change and Its Limits,”  Foreign Affairs , vol. 84, no. 4 (July/
Aug. 2005): 73 ― 74; and Walt, “Shattered,” 26. 
 10.  Hulsman,  Paradigm , 45 ― 46; and Robert Ellisworth and Dimitri Simes, “Realism’s 
Shining Morality,”  The National Interest (Winter 2004/05): 7 ― 9. 
 11.  Francis Fukuyama,  America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the 
Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006),: 64. 
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 2．Neo-conservatism 
 　 Neo-conservatives recognize that core national interests of the U.S. are to 
maintain its hegemonic status and to spread the values of democracy, individual 
liberty, and a free-market economy enjoyed by the U.S. to the outside world.12  In 
order to realize these interests, neo-conservatism offers the following policy 
prescriptions.  First, the U.S. needs to strengthen its military power to sustain its 
primacy and global leadership and to prevent the emergence of rival great powers 
challenging American hegemony.  Second, the U.S. must pursue policies that 
spread its values internationally, if necessary by using military means.  Third, 
policies need to be set up to replace or overthrow regimes or organizations that 
threaten American values and security.  Neo-conservatives prescribe a U.S. policy 
of conducting a pre-emptive war against them when necessary.13 
 　 Neo-conservatives prefer unilateralism to multilateralism because they regard 
international law and institutions as constraining American power.14  They are 
skeptical about roles of international institutions since international treaties and 
multilateral agreements are not very helpful in achieving U.S. foreign policy 
goals, and, at worst, they severely limit its sovereignty and freedom of action. 
Neo-conservatives also have a unilateralist view about the utility of an alliance. 
In other words, they take a view of utilizing an alliance only if it conforms to 
American leadership and is useful in solving problems facing the U.S.15 
 3．Liberal Internationalism 
 　 Liberal internationalists conceive of American core national interest as creating 
a more peaceful and collaborative world order founded on strong international 
institutions and the spread of democracy under U.S. leadership.  This conception 
was influenced by former President Woodrow Wilson’s thought that the spread of 
democracy is essential to global stability.16  Liberal institutionalists have a positive 
view about the role and capacity of international institutions, particularly the 
 12.  Skidmore,  Paradoxes , 5 ― 6. 
 13.  Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “Beyond the Realist Theories: ‘Neo-Conservative Realism’ 
and the American Invasion of Iraq,”  International Studies Perspectives , vol. 7, issue 3 (August 
2006): 250 ― 51; and Yuen Foong Khong, “Neo-conservativism and the Domestic Source of 
American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Operation and Iraqi Freedom,” in  Foreign 
Policy: Theories · Actors · Cases , Steve Smith et al., eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 256 ― 58. 
 14.  Fukuyama,  Crossroads , 64 ― 65. 
 15.  John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, “Liberal Realism: The Foundations of a 
Democratic Foreign Policy,”  The National Interest , issue 77 (2004): 44. 
 16.  Skidmore,  Paradoxes , 7. 
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United Nations, in promoting international cooperation and peace in the post-Cold 
War world.  Since effective international institutions are needed to enhance 
capabilities of the international society to address global problems arising from 
deepening international interdependence, developing such institutions is 
considered to be a vital U.S. interest.17  Liberal institutionalists urge Washington’s 
policy makers to pursue a multilateral foreign policy.  Such a policy consists of 
making efforts to create and sustain international institutions, which will facilitate 
the coordination of U.S. relations with other cooperative states, and of complying 
with rules, norms, and principles provided by the institutions.18 
 　 Unlike neo-conservatives or realists, liberal internationalists argue that the U.S. 
should pursue a policy of engagement, rather than one of containment or 
confrontation, through multilateral mechanisms towards non-democratic countries. 
In other words, the engagement policy aims to induce them to gradual internal 
reform by promoting their openness and exposing their people to democratic 
practices through cooperation within the framework of international institutions. 
In order to entice non-cooperative or hostile states into cooperation, liberal 
institutionalists also favor an engagement policy centered upon incentives, such as 
multilateral aid, economic cooperative agreements, and international regimes, 
rather than a pressure policy based on sanctions and other coercive measures.19 
Although U.S. military power is overwhelmingly dominant, military means are 
considered to be very ineffective in exercising influence in non-military issue 
areas.  Liberal institutionalists also estimate that economic sanctions tend to be 
ineffective in coercing other countries into changing their policies and behavior. 
But they expect that multilateral sanctions will be more effective than unilateral 
ones when they are inevitably used.20 
 II:  The Obama Administration’s North Korea Policy: Strategic Patience 
 　 During the two terms of the Obama Administration, it pursued a policy of so-
called “strategic patience” in the face of North Korea’s persistent pursuit of its 
nuclear program and cycles of provocations.  As soon as former President Obama 
took office in January 2009, Pyongyang committed a series of provocations, 
including a test of long-range ballistic missile on April 5 and a second nuclear test 
on May 14.  In reaction to the tests, the UN Security Council unanimously 
adopted Resolution 1874 in June 2009 to impose further economic sanctions on 
North Korea, such as authorizing UN member states to inspect its cargo and 
 17.  Callahan,  Logics , 94 ― 99. 
 18.  David Skidmore, “Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in U.S. Foreign Policy,” 
 Foreign Policy Analysis 2 (2005): 208 ― 20. 
 19.  Skidmore,  Paradoxes , 7. 
 20.  Callahan,  Logics , 100 ― 102. 
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destroy any goods suspected of being connected to its nuclear program, and 
extending the arms embargo on it.21 
 　 Coping with North Korea’s provocations, the Obama Administration 
formulated and mostly held to a North Korea policy that then-Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton described as “strategic patience in close coordination with our six-
party allies.”22  The key stance of the strategic patience policy was that the U.S. 
would not engage in negotiations with North Korea until the latter first shows the 
concrete evidence of committing to denuclearization.  Based on such a policy, 
Washington demanded that Pyongyang should first “take concrete, irreversible 
denuclearization steps toward fulfillment of the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-
Party Talks,” as a precondition for direct talks.23  The policy included closely 
cooperating with the U.S. allies, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, in 
deterring and taking actions against North Korea’s provocations, and pressuring 
Pyongyang through multilateral U.N. and unilateral sanctions to halt and abandon 
its nuclear program.  The policy also involved persuading China, North Korea’s 
long-standing ally and largest trading partner, to put necessary pressure more on 
the country to stop its nuclear program and military provocations.24 
 　 The U.S. policy of strategic patience is interpreted as deriving from the 
blending of realist and liberal internationalist schools of thought.  The policy goal 
was to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of North Korea through multilateral 
diplomacy based on the Six-Party Talks.  For this goal, the bulk of the 
administration’s first term fruitlessly devoted its diplomatic efforts to persuade 
Pyongyang to return to its commitment to abandoning its nuclear program, as 
previously promised in a Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks agreed on 
September 19, 2005.  According to the Statement, if North Korea dismantled its 
nuclear programs and returned to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons and to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards, the five 
parties would agree to provide North Korea with U.S. assurance against an attack 
on the North; the eventual normalization of relations with the U.S. and Japan; 
economic aid and cooperation; and the negotiation for a permanent peace regime 
on the Korean Peninsula.25 
 21.  The UN Security Council, “Security Council, Acting Unanimously, Condemns in 
Strongest Terms Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Nuclear Test, Toughens Sanctions,” 
June 12, 2009, https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9679.doc.htm. 
 22.  “Clinton Calls ‘Exploratory’ Meeting with North Korea ‘Quite Positive’,”  Voice of 
America News , December 10, 2009, https://www.voanews.com/a/clinton-calls-exploratory-
meeting-with-north-korea-quite-positive-78980687/416329.html. 
 23.  U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “U.S. Relations with 
North Korea,” October 18, 2016, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm. 
 24.  Emma Chanlett-Avery et al.,  North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and 
Internal Situation . CRS Report, Congressional Research Service. January 15, 2016, 6 ― 7. 
 25.  See “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” September 19, 2005, 
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 　 As North Korea refused to commit denuclearization and continued to develop 
nuclear weapons, however, the U.S. embarked on imposing punishing sanctions 
against it.  This U.S. policy was consistent with the realists’ policy prescriptions 
in dealing with hostile non-democratic states which develop weapons of mass 
destruction, that is, a policy of engagement based on carrot-and-stick diplomacy 
using both reward and punishment to induce their cooperation. 
 　 In the face of recurring North Korea’s provocations during the first term of the 
Obama Administration, Washington sought to urge Pyongyang to stop them and 
return to the six-party talks, not only by holding high-level meetings between 
them, but also by applying multilateral economic sanctions on North Korea.  The 
U.S. special representatives for North Korea policy held high-level talks three 
times, as part of efforts to restart denuclearization negotiations, in December 
2009, July 2011, and October 2011.  In an additional effort to revive the talks, 
former U.S.  President Jimmy Carter, accompanied by the former leaders of 
Finland, Norway, and Ireland, visited Pyongyang, on April 25- 27, 2011, to have 
meetings with its foreign minister and the president of its parliament.26 
 　 Finally, the U.S. held a round of bilateral talks with North Korea on February 
23 - 24, 2012, and they reached the so-called “Leap Day Agreement” on February 
29.  Under this agreement, North Korea would impose a moratorium on its nuclear 
weapons and long-range missile tests, and suspend its uranium enrichment 
activities at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, and allow the IAEA inspectors to 
monitor the suspension.  In return for these steps, the U.S. would provide the 
country with 240,000 metric tons of food aid under the intensive monitoring.27 
This agreement, if fully implemented, was expected to lead to the resumption of 
the six-party talks for denuclearization.  The agreement failed to be carried out, 
however, as Pyongyang launched a satellite using a three-stage rocket, on April 
13, 2012, in an attempt to develop ballistic missile technology, and Washington 
responded by cancelling its plan of food aid to North Koreans. 
 　 Since then, during the second term of the Obama Administration, Washington 
focused on applying escalating economic sanctions on the communist regime to 
press it to return to the negotiating table, while its previous policy of engagement 
through direct diplomacy was renounced.  This policy was largely because the 
newly established Kim Jong-un regime recalcitrantly continued to augment its 
nuclear and ballistic-missile capabilities through their testing.  The U.S. policy of 
pressure based on sanctions was still to follow the realist prescription of taking 
punishing measures against hostile regimes, as a part of carrot-and-stick 
https://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm. 
 26.  “Jimmy Carter leaves North Korea after peace mission,”  The Guardian , April 28, 2011, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/28/jimmy-carter-north-korea-peace-mission. 
 27.  Victoria Nuland, “U.S.-DPRK Bilateral Discussions,” Press Statement, U.S. Department 
of State, February 29, 2012, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184869.htm. 
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diplomacy, in case of their recurrent non-cooperation and provocations.  As a 
result, the pattern of North Korean nuclear or ballistic missile tests and reacting 
stepped-up sanctions following U.S.-led U.N.  Security Council Resolutions in 
mutual recrimination was repeated throughout the remainder of the Obama 
Administration. 
 　 As Table 1 below shows, the U.S. policy of pressure based on punitive 
sanctions was largely centered on multilateral economic sanctions under U.N. 
Security Council resolutions.  Such a policy is interpreted as deriving from the 
liberal internationalism which prescribes multilateral sanctions, rather than 
unilateral ones, through international institutions, such as the U.N., in order to 
induce recalcitrant states to cooperate. 
〈Table 1〉U.N. Sanctions on North Korea during the Obama Administration
North Korean 
Provocation
UNSC Resolution & Principle Sanctions
2nd Nuclear Test
(May 25, 2009)
Resolution 1874 (June 12, 2009)
・Inspecting NK cargo on land, air, and sea
・Expanding the arms embargo by banning all imports and exports of weapons, except 
for small arms and light weapons
・Preventing financial services relating to the nuclear or missile programs




Resolution 2087 (Jan. 22, 2013)
・Expanding measures to seize and destroy material suspected of being connected to 
NK’s weapons development or research
・Expanding measures imposed on persons suspected of involvement with NK’s nuclear 
program
・Listing individuals and entities for asset freezes and the travel ban, for violations under 
Resolution 171828 and 1874
3rd Nuclear Test
(Feb. 12, 2013)
Resolution 2094 (March 7, 2013)
・Adding nuclear and missile dual-use technologies and luxury goods to the list of 
banned imports
・Designating additional individuals and entities for asset freezes and the travel ban
・Blocking the NK regime from bulk cash transfers
・Restricting NK’s ties to international banking systems
 28. Resolution 1718 was adopted by the U.N. Security Council on October 14, 2006, in 
response to North Korea’s first nuclear test on October 9. The resolution banned imports and 
exports of heavy weaponry to North Korea, imposed an asset freeze of entities providing 
support for the country’s nuclear and missile programs, and prohibited exports of luxury goods 
to the country. The full text of the resolution is available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_ 
doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1718(2006). 





Resolution 2270 (March 2, 2016)
・Expanding the arms embargo to include small arms and light arms
・Banning NK’s exports of coal, iron, iron ore, gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, and 
rare earth minerals, except for livelihood purposes and for transactions unrelated to its 
nuclear or missile programs
・Mandatory inspections on cargo to/from NK
・Prohibiting countries from opening new financial institutions or bank branches in NK
5th Nuclear Test
(Sept. 9, 2016)
Resolution 2321 (Nov. 30, 2016)
・Banning NK’s exports of monuments, copper, nickel, silver, and zinc
・Imposing a binding cap cutting NK’s largest export, coal, by $700 million per year 
(more than 60%)
・Prohibiting the sale of new vessels and helicopters to NK
・Requiring the closure of foreign bank offices, accounts, and subsidiaries in NK within 
90 days
・Expanding the list of prohibited dual-use items related to WMD
Source:  “UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea,” Arms Control Association, August 2017, https://
www.armscontrol.org/print/5653.
 　 Under the policy of strategic patience, the U.S. moved to tighten security 
cooperation with South Korea by strengthening their joint deterrence and defense 
posture in the face of North Korea’s recurrent military provocations.  In June 
2015, the U.S. and ROK militaries established a new war plan, “Operations Plan 
(OPLAN) 5015” to include preemptive strikes on North Korea’s nuclear and 
missile facilities as well as its top leaders in a Korean Peninsula contingency.  The 
new plan reportedly focused on carrying out the new operational concept of the 
“4Ds” to detect, disrupt, destroy, and defend against North Korean ballistic missile 
threats.  Since 2016, the two allies have begun to conduct joint military exercises 
to practice the new plan, while they expanded existing ones, including rehearsals 
of surgical strikes on North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities and raids for 
removing its leadership.29  And they jointly developed and carried out the “tailored 
deterrence strategy” designed to provide the ROK with a “nuclear umbrella” 
against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats.  In order to effectively 
implement the strategy, they established the Deterrence Strategy Committee 
(DSC) in April 2015, a new deputy minister-level consultative body, to integrate 
the existing Extended Deterrence Policy Committee and Counter-Missile 
Capability Committee.  The DSC has conducted annual joint exercises involving 
 29.  “OPLAN 5015 (Operation Plans)” March 7, 2016, https://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/ops/oplan-5015.htm; Anna Fifield, “In drills, U.S., South Korea practice striking 
North’s nuclear plants, leaders,”  The Washington Post , March 7, 2016; and Michael Peck, 
“OPLAN 5015: The Secret Plan for Destroying North Korea (and Start World War III?)”  The 
National Interest , March 11, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/oplan-5015-the-
secret-plan-destroying-north-korea-start-19747. 
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the use of extended deterrence measures.30 
 　 In response to North Korea’s fourth and fifth nuclear tests and test-launching 
of ballistic missiles in 2016, the U.S. military deployed its strategic assets, such as 
B - 52 and B - 1B bombers, F - 22 stealth fighter jets, and the USS nuclear submarine, 
over South Korea to deter further North Korea’s provocations.31  Furthermore, the 
U.S. and the ROK in July 2016 decided to deploy the Terminal High-Altitude 
Area Defense (THAAD) system, an advanced missile defense system, to the U.S. 
forces in Korea in order to reinforce defense capabilities of the alliance against 
North Korea’s ballistic missile threats.32  These U.S. measures are consistent with 
a realist prescription of undertaking mutual security cooperation with its allies in 
order to effectively cope with hostile nations. 
 　 Despite its attempts through direct diplomacy and/or a series of punitive U.N. 
sanctions to persuade Pyongyang to stop provocations and return to the Six-Party 
talks, however, the Obama Administration’s policy of strategic patience finally 
failed to achieve its main goal of halting North Korea’s illicit nuclear and missile 
programs leading to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.  Since President 
Obama entered office, North Korea conducted four underground nuclear tests, 
including two in 2016, and about 50 ballistic missile and rocket launches.  In 
addition, the country’s nuclear threat expanded as a result of steady progress in 
developing nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them through such tests.  By 
late 2016, North Korea was assessed to have enough plutonium for about 10 
nuclear warheads.  In addition, it was known to have a facility to produce highly-
enriched uranium for weapons.  Experts estimated that if it was operating properly, 
the facility could produce the material for 6 - 8 uranium based warheads, bringing 
the total to 16 - 18 warheads by late 2016.  Military analysts expected that by 2020 
North Korea could have a nuclear arsenal ranging from 20 to 100 warheads.33 
Eventually, the strategic policy turned out a failure in dissuading Pyongyang from 
advancing its nuclear and missile programs. 
 　 The U.S. policy of strategic patience also failed to convince China to put 
diplomatic pressure and strictly implement U.N. sanctions against North Korea to 
the extent that the country could suspend its nuclear program and return to the 
negotiation table.  Beijing had been passive and even reluctant in formulating and 
enforcing U.N.  Security Council resolutions involving more punitive sanctions on 
Pyongyang. Rather, China tended to be supportive, rather than critical, of North 
 30.  ROK Ministry of Defense,  2016 Defense White Paper (December 2016): 67 ― 68, http://
www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd/upload/pblictn/ PBLICTNEBOOK_201705180311469090.pdf. 
 31.  ROK Ministry of Defense,  2016 Defense White Paper , 150. 
 32.  For timelines and effectiveness of the THAAD, see ROK Ministry of Defense,  2016 
Defense White Paper , 251 ― 54. 
 33.  Daryl Kimball and Kelsey Davenport, “Recalibrating U.S. Policy toward North Korea,” 
 Issue Briefs , vol. 9, issue 1, February 2017, Arms Control Association, https://www.
armscontrol.org/Issue-Briefs/2017-02-01/Recalibrating-US-Policy-Toward-North-Korea. 
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Korea, as a main trading partner and longstanding ally.  Bruce Klingner, a senior 
researcher of the Heritage Foundation, described China as “enabler of North 
Korean misbehavior.” From his viewpoint, China acted as “North Korea’s defense 
lawyer” in the U.N. by “resisting stronger sanctions; watering down resolution 
texts; insisting on expansive loopholes; and minimally enforcing resolutions.”34 
 　 A primary reason for the failure of the strategic patience policy was because 
North Korea remained determined to become a nuclear weapons state which has 
enough nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles to assure regime security, while 
the country seemed to have no intention of giving up its nuclear program in return 
for incentives, such as economic aid and diplomatic recognition.35  North Korea’s 
constitution was amended in April 2012 to describe the country as a “nuclear-
armed nation.” In March 2013, the Kim Jong-un regime adopted a new “Byungjin 
Line,” that is, a policy of simultaneously pursuing the development of its economy 
and nuclear weapons.  At that time, Pyongyang reiterated that its nuclear program 
was not “a bargaining chip” and announced that “nuclear weapons serve as an all-
powerful treasured sword for protecting the sovereignty and security of the 
country.”36  In light of this policy stance, North Korea has considered its nuclear 
armament as essential to its regime security against perceived external threats. 
According to the U.S. Intelligence Community’s views, Pyongyang’s nuclear 
program has been multipurpose for “deterrence, international prestige, and 
coercive diplomacy.”37  It was also estimated that the Kim Jong-un regime has 
sought to become a nuclear weapons state as a way to secure its domestic 
legitimacy.38  Hence it has had little interest in the resumption of the aborted 
negotiations toward denuclearization. 
 34.  Bruce Klingner, “Creating a Comprehensive Policy Response to North Korean Threats 
and Provocations,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, September 14, 2016, 5. http://www.heritage.
org/testimony/creating-comprehensive-policy-response-north-korean-threats-and-
provocations. 
 35.  Chanlett-Avery et al.,  North Korea , 8; Robert S. Litwak,  Preventing North Korea’s 
Nuclear Breakout , Wilson Center, February 2017, 65 ― 66, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/
default/files/preventing_north_koreas_nuclear_breakout.pdf. 
 36.  Greg Botelho, “North Korea: Nuclear program not a bargaining chip,”  CNN News , 
March 16, 2013, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/16/world/asia/north-korea-us-nuclear/index.
html. 
 37. Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, “Statement for the Record 
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence, May 11, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/
SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf
 38. Scott Snyder, “Confronting the North Korean Threat: Reassessing Policy Options,” 
Statement before U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1st Session, 115th Congress, 
January 31, 2017, 1-3, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/013117_Snyder_
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 　 Another reason for the policy failure was because the U.S. government made 
some miscalculations about North Korea.  According to an analysis by Joel Wit, a 
senior fellow at the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, the Obama Administration’s 
policy makers were based on the following flawed assumptions about North 
Korea’s intentions and circumstances: (1) weaken North Korea needs to improve 
its relations with the U.S. for help; (2) since the Kim Jong-un regime remains 
isolated, it would go broke; (3) in case of the North’s continued provocations, 
China would change its reluctant position and strictly implement U.N. sanctions 
against the country; and (4) Pyongyang wouldn’t comply with any settlements it 
would reach with other concerned nations.39  Some other experts also point out 
that a faulty assumption about North Korea’s collapse at some point among part 
of U.S. policy makers led them to persist in the strategic patience policy, which 
was called a policy of “wait and see,” and thus respond so passively to 
Pyongyang’s advancing the nuclear and missile programs as to fail to stop them.40 
 　 However, these assumptions turned out to be largely inconsistent with reality 
by the end of the Obama Administration.  Above all, the North Korean regime 
showed considerable resilience in the face of tightening sanctions, diplomatic 
isolation, and economic hardship.  In particular, North Korean’s economy 
reportedly grew in 2016 at the fastest pace since 1999, in spite of step-up U.N. 
economic sanctions, according to South Korea’s central bank data.  The country’s 
GDP in 2016 expanded by 3.9% over the year, which was the highest rate of 
growth since a 6.1% rise in 1999.  The growth was largely driven by its mining, 
manufacturing, and energy sectors, along with military spending.41  North Korea’s 
foreign trade also steadily increased over the past decade.  In 2016, it grew 4.7% 
year-on-year to reach $6.55 billion which was a 123% increase compared to the 
2007 trade value.42 
 　 China was passive and ambivalent responses to the North Korean nuclear 
problem and provocations, while it publicly declared that the denuclearization of 
 39.  Joel S. Wit, “Trapped in No-Man’s-Land: The Future of US Policy Toward North 
Korea,” North Korea’s Nuclear Futures Series, US-Korea Institute at SAIS, (June 2016), 10 ―
 11, http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/NKNF_Wit-2016-06.pdf; and “The Way 
Ahead: North Korea Policy Recommendations for the Trump Administration,” US-Korea 
Inst i tute at  SAIS,  (December 2016),  11,  ht tp: / /www.38north.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/12/2016-12-Policy_Wit.pdf 
 40.  See Jong Kun Choi, “The Perils of Strategic Patience with North Korea,”  The 
Washington Quarterly , vol. 38, no. 4 (Winter 2016): 57 ― 72; Michael Hirsh, “Hillary’s North 
Korean Problem,”  Politico , January 6, 2016; and Maria R. Coduti, “The Limits of ‘Strategic 
Patience’: How Obama failed on North Korea,”  NK News , November 2, 2016. 
 41.  “North Korea 2016 Economic Growth at 17 - Year High Despite Sanctions,”  Reuters , 
July 21, 2017. 
 42.  Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA),  North Korea’s Foreign Trade 
Trends in 2016 (July 2017): 3. http://dl.kotra.or.kr/search/DetailView.ax?cid=314639. 
NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES 39 / 2017 57
North Korea was one of its foreign policy goals.  China has been reluctant to 
exercise enough diplomatic and financial pressure upon the DPRK to halt its 
nuclear program and return to the negotiations for denuclearization because the 
Chinese government has been concerned that such pressure might threaten the 
survival of the North Korean regime.  U.S. experts assessed that Beijing has been 
putting its top policy priority on preventing the collapse of the regime in 
Pyongyang, rather than achieving its denuclearization.  Beijing appeared to fear 
that its instability or collapse might cause a refugee crisis and the potential 
military intervention of the other foreign countries, especially the U.S., at the 
border between China and North Korea in case of power vacuum in Pyongyang.43 
 　 Because of its top priority on stability, Beijing was estimated to provide 
Pyongyang with most of its energy and food supplies through trade and aid in 
spite of increasing the latter’s recurrent nuclear and missile tests.44  In addition, 
the data shows that foreign trade between the two nations increased steadily 
during the Obama Administration.  China was the largest trading partner of North 
Korea, accounting for 92.5% of the latter’s total trade volume in 2016, the highest 
figure ever.  Pyongyang’s dependence on Beijing in foreign trade has deepened 
since 2005 when it exceeded 50% of North Korea’s total trade volume for the first 
time.  It exceeded 90% for the first time in 2014 and for three consecutive years 
until 2016.  It is noteworthy that, despite economic sanctions imposed by U.N. 
Security Council Resolutions 2270 and 2321, the bilateral trade volume in 2016 
increased by about 6% over the previous year to reach about $6.06 billion which 
was a 207% rise over the last decade.45  The data indicate that Beijing didn’t seem 
to fully implement the U.N. sanctions of trade restrictions against Pyongyang. 
 　 In short, the policy of strategic patience during the Obama Administration is 
interpreted as reflecting the blending of realist and liberal internationalist 
prescriptions.  The first-term administration pursued a policy of engagement and 
pressure in line with a realist prescription for a carrot-and-stick diplomacy not 
only by attempting to persuade Pyongyang to halt its nuclear and missile programs 
through high-level meetings and the deal-making of the “Leap Day Agreement” 
with Pyongyang, but also by applying multilateral economic sanctions.  The 
second-term administration adopted a pressure-focused policy based on applying 
increasing economic sanctions on North Korea to coerce it to return to the 
negotiating table.  The policy of strengthening joint deterrence and defense 
 43.  See Bates Gill, “China’s North Korea Policy: Assessing Interests and Influences,” 
Special Report, United States Institute of Peace (July 2011): 4 ― 8, https://www.usip.org/sites/
default/files/China%27s_North_Korea_Policy.pdf; Rinehart et al. (2016), 8 ― 9; and Eleanor 
Albert, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Backgrounder, The Council on Foreign 
Relations, July 2017, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship. 
 44.  Eleanor Albert, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
September 27, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship. 
 45.  KOTRA, 2017, 14 ― 15, http://dl.kotra.or.kr/search/DetailView.ax?cid=314639. 
NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES 39 / 201758
posture with the ROK was to follow the realist prescription for close mutual 
cooperation with allies in order to effectively deal with hostile nations.  On the 
other hand, the strategic patience policy depended on a multilateral approach in 
which to seek the expansion of economic sanctions on North Korea which were 
adopted through diplomatic negotiations in the U.N. Security Council.  This 
policy was consistent with the liberal internationalist prescription.  However, its 
pressure-focused policy was out of accord with the liberal internationalist stance 
favoring an incentive-focused engagement policy.  Ultimately, the policy of 
strategic patience failed to achieve its goal of pushing Pyongyang toward 
denuclearization mainly because of its holding on to the policy of becoming a 
nuclear-armed state, U.S. miscalculations about North Korea, and China’s 
reluctance in pressuring the communist regime to abandon its nuclear and missile 
programs. 
 III:  The Trump Administration’s North Korea Policy: 
Strategic Accountability 
 　 Since President Donald Trump took office on January 20, 2017, North Korea 
has continued its provocations by conducting the sixth nuclear test on September 
3 and carrying out multiple ballistic missile tests until September, including 
launching two Hwasong - 14 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), for the 
first time, capable of reaching the U.S. mainland in July and two intermediate-
range ballistic missile tests in May and August.  In the face of such provocations, 
the Trump Administration has settled on a new North Korea policy, while it has 
taken defensive measures to strengthen its deterrence against them. 
 　 After completing a two-month review, in mid-April the administration adopted 
a new North Korea policy, called “strategic accountability,” which would centered 
on “maximum pressure and engagement” toward the denuclearization of the 
communist regime.46  In this new policy, U.S. policy makers have considered 
North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons as an “urgent national security 
threat and top foreign policy priority.” They make it clear that the ultimate goal of 
the U.S.  North Korea policy is to accomplish the “complete, verifiable and 
irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a dismantling of the 
 46.  For official statements about the new North Korea policy, see U.S. Department of State, 
Joint Statement by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, 
Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, April 26, 2017, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2017/04/270464.htm; Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James 
Mattis, “We are Holding Pyongyang to Account,”  The Wall Street Journal , August 13, 2017, 
http:www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/08/273409.htm; and Susan Thornton, Acting 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “North Korea Policy,” Statement at a 
Testimony before the House of Foreign Affairs Committee, September 12, 2017, https://www.
state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2017/09/274003.htm. 
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regime’s ballistic-missile program.”47  This policy statement is intended to wipe 
out the possibility or concern that Washington’s policy goal could change into 
simply one of halting or freezing North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. 
The components of the strategic accountability policy include (1) tightening 
pressure on North Korea through unilateral and multilateral economic sanctions; 
(2) not pursuing a policy of regime change through military means; (3) actively 
engaging with China to exert enough pressure on North Korea to change its 
behavior; (4) strengthening defense posture and military readiness, through close 
cooperation with South Korea and Japan, against North Korea’s provocations; and 
(5) seeking conditional engagement with the communist regime. 
 　 First, the policy of strategic accountability calls for “maximum pressure” 
mainly through economic sanctions on Pyongyang to stop its provocative actions 
and to coerce the country into the negotiation table.  Its focus on “maximum 
pressure” mainly based on increasing unilateral and multilateral sanctions is 
consistent with the realist prescription of taking punitive measures against hostile 
regimes, as a part of carrot-and-stick diplomacy, in the face of their recurrent non-
cooperation and provocations.  Under this policy, President Trump on August 3 
signed into law a bill to strengthen sanctions against North Korea, as well as 
Russia and Iran.  The sanctions on North Korea target those providing the country 
with crude oil and other products that help its nuclear and missile programs.  They 
were first unilateral measures in response to Pyongyang's two tests of ICBMs in 
July.  The new law also prohibits ships owned by the North Korean government or 
any country not complying with U.N.  Security Council resolutions from docking 
in the U.S. and bans goods produced by North Korean workers overseas from 
entering the U.S. 48
 　 On the other hand, the Trump Administration has put the focus of its pressure 
policy on imposing multilateral sanctions through the U.N. Security Council 
resolutions against North Korea.  Its officials made it clear that the U.S. would 
continue “to consolidate international unity on the North Korean issue through 
increased engagement at the U.N., at regional diplomatic forums, and in capitals 
around the world.”49  The case for multilateral approach through the U.N. is 
consistent with the liberal internationalist logic.  Under this policy, Washington 
led the U.N. Security Council to unanimously adopt Resolution 2371 on August 5 
to impose more punitive sanctions on the communist regime in response to its two 
tests of ICBMs in July.  The resolution’s provisions included a complete ban on 
exports of coal, iron, iron ore, lead, lead ore, and seafood which would reduce its 
annual export revenue of about $3 billion by a third.  The resolution also 
 47.  Tillerson and Mattis, “Pyongyang.” 
 48.  “Trump endorses new sanctions on North Korea,”  The Korea Times , August 3, 2017, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/08/103_234105.html. 
 49.  Tillerson and Mattis, “Pyongyang.” 
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prohibited countries from increasing the number of North Korean workers hired 
by them and from opening new joint ventures with the communist nation or 
expanding existing joint ventures through any new investment.  Furthermore, it 
called for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks for denuclearization 
negotiations.50  However, the new sanctions did not include any reduction or ban 
on exports of crude oil to North Korea mainly from China, which reportedly 
seemed to be a compromise resulting from U.S.-Chinese negotiations about the 
scope of the sanctions.51 
 　 Moreover, promptly reacting to North Korea’s sixth and most powerful nuclear 
test of a possible hydrogen bomb on September 3, the Trump Administration took 
the initiative in adopting Resolution 2375 by the U.N. Security Council on 
September 11 which contains the most stringent sanctions ever imposed on the 
communist regime.  The new resolution bans the export of all natural gas liquids 
and condensates to North Korea and prevents other countries from exporting 
crude oil to the country in excess of the current amount of 4 million barrels per 
year.  And it limits the import of refined petroleum products to 2 million barrels 
per year which is equivalent to 45% of the current annual import volume.  As a 
result, the sanctions would reduce about 30% of overall oil supplies to North 
Korea, if fully implemented.  In addition, the resolution bans the export of all 
North Korean textile products, which are the second largest export category, and 
prohibits countries from providing new work authorization to North Koreans.  It 
also bans new joint ventures with North Korea and requires existing joint ventures 
to be closed within 120 days.52 
 　 The sanctions of the new resolution fell short of those of the U.S.-led draft 
resolution.  The U.S. government sought a full-scale oil embargo on North Korea 
and an international asset freeze on its leader Kim Jong-un and his sister Yo-jong, 
as part of the new sanctions.  However, such measures were excluded from the 
final adopted resolution in order to win the support of China and Russia opposing 
them.  In the process of multilateral negotiations at the U.N., the U.S. seemed to 
finally compromise with its two counterparts on the watered-down resolution to 
 50.  See the United Nations, “Security Council Toughens Sanctions Against Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2371,” August 5, 2017, 
Meeting Coverage and Press Releases, https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12945.doc.htm. 
 51.  Michelle Nichols, “U.N. Vote Saturday on U.S. bid to slash North Korea exports over 
missile tests,”  Reuters , August 5, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-
missiles-un-vote/u-n-vote-saturday-on-u-s-bid-to-slash-north-korea-exports-over-missile-tests-
idUSKBN1AK1WX. 
 52.  See the United Nations, “Security Council Imposes Fresh Sanctions on Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, Including Bans on Natural Gas Sales, Work Authorization for Its 
Nationals, Meetings Coverage,” September 11, 2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/
sc12983.doc.htm. 
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ensure its adoption.53  The effectiveness of the new sanctions largely depends on 
how fully and strictly China will enforce them. 
 　 On the other hand, President Trump on September 21 announced a new 
executive order authorizing the U.S. Department of Treasury to impose sanctions 
on individuals and entities that do business with North Korea.  The new order 
contains provisions for (1) imposing sanctions on any foreign financial institution 
which conducts or facilitates significant transactions in connection with trade with 
North Korea; (2) expanding sanctions to individuals involved in the construction, 
energy, financial services, fishing, information technology, manufacturing, 
medical, mining, textiles, or transportation industries in North Korea; and (3) 
prohibiting vessels and aircraft visiting North Korea from entering the U.S. for 
180 days.54  This executive order was regarded as the most powerful unilateral 
sanctions ever against the communist regime, aiming to further contain and 
strangle its economic sectors, which supported its nuclear and missile programs. 
As the first action to implement the order, the Treasury Department on September 
26 designated eight North Korean banks and twenty-six North Koreans working 
in China, Russia, Libya and the United Arab Emirates as additional targets of 
sanctions.55  This measure was taken as a preliminary step to prevent any foreign 
financial institution from transacting with the North Korean banks so as to isolate 
them from the international financial system.
 　 Moreover, President Trump on November 20 put North Korea back on a list of 
state sponsors of terrorism in a move aimed at stepping up pressure on the country. 
As designated on the list, the Kim regime will face four sets of U.S. sanctions: a 
ban on arms-related exports and sales; controls over exports of dual-use items; 
prohibitions on economic assistance; and imposition of miscellaneous financial 
and other restrictions, including blocking loans by international financial 
institutions.56  In view of the fact that North Korea has been already taken under 
comprehensive U.N. and U.S. sanctions, its designation will have a symbolic 
effect of being branded as a “rouge state,” rather than an effect of imposing 
additional sanctions, so as to dissuade other countries from transacting with it. 
 53.  Somini Sengupta, “After U.S. Compromise, Security Council Strengthens North Korea 
Sanctions,”  The New York Times , September 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/
world/asia/us-security-council-north-korea.html. 
 54.  For a summary of the new executive order, see the Office of Press Secretary at the 
White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Increases Pressure to Cut off Funding for 
North Korea,” September 21, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/09/21/
fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-increases-pressure-cut-funding-north. 
 55.  Rick Gladstone, “North Korean Banks and Citizens Added to U.S. Sanctions List,”  The 
New York Times , September 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/asia/north-
korea-sanctions.html. 
 56. The U.S. Department of State, “Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism,” https://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/31944.pdf.
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Next day the U.S. government continued to ratchet up economic pressure on 
North Korea by imposing new sanctions on 13 North Korean and Chinese entities, 
including 3 Chinese trading companies, a Chinese national, and 20 North Korean 
vessels. Given that North Korea’s Maritime Administration, its transport ministry, 
shipping companies, and their vessels were included in targets of the new 
sanctions,  they were primarily intended to block its maritime trade.57
 　 Second, U.S. officials made it clear that Washington would not pursue a policy 
of regime change or collapse through coercive measures.  In his first address to 
State Department officials on May 2, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson already 
issued the so-called “Four Nos” principle of North Korea policy in which the U.S. 
would not seek a policy of regime change or collapse, an accelerated reunification 
of the Korean Peninsula, or an excuse to deploy U.S. forces north of the 
Demilitarized Zone.58  Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mattis in their 
policy statement reiterated this principle and add another “no” principle to it by 
saying that “we have no desire to inflict harm on the long-suffering North Korean 
people, who are distinct from the hostile regime in Pyongyang.”59  The principle 
gained support and consensus from the newly launched South Korean government, 
when President Moon Jae-in pointed out it as a basic direction shared between the 
two allies in his address on July 3 during his official visit to Washington D.C.60 
Since the principle was in line with the Chinese position of addressing the nuclear 
problem through dialogue and diplomacy, Beijing also officially welcomed it and 
reportedly urged Pyongyang to respond to it.61  The principle is also consistent 
with the realist logic opposing a neo-conservative policy of regime change. 
 　 Third, the policy of strategic accountability places emphasis on China’s role in 
exercising its “decisive diplomatic and economic leverage over North Korea” so 
as to stop the nuclear and missile programs and make the country return to the 
negotiation table.62  Following this policy, Washington has urged Beijing to fully 
enforce multilateral U.N. sanctions against the Kim Jong-un regime.  As a result, 
Beijing appeared to change some of its sanctions policy toward Pyongyang and 
thus became somewhat willing to implement U.N. sanctions.  As evidence, China 
 57. Matthew Pennington, “U.S. slaps new sanctions on North Korean, Chinese companies,” 
The Washington Times, November 21, 2017, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/
nov/21/us-announcing-new-nkorea-sanctions-after-terror-de/
 58.  Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, “Remarks to U.S. Department of State Employees,” 
May 3, 2017, https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/05/270620.htm. 
 59.  Tillerson and Mattis, “Pyongyang.” 
 60.  “In US, Pres. Moon stresses North Korea policy based on ‘four nos’,”  The Hankyoreh , 
July 3, 2017, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/801214.html. 
 61.  Michael Martina, “China welcomes U.S. seeking dialogue with North Korea,”  Reuters , 
August 3, 2017, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-northkorea-missiles-china/china-welcomes-u-
s-seeking-dialogue-with-north-korea-idUKKBN1AJ0JS. 
 62. Tillerson and Mattis, “Pyongyang” 
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has continued to suspend all imports of coal from North Korea since late February 
2017 in order to implement the sanctions imposed by Resolution 2321. 
Consequently, China’s coal imports from North Korea in the first half of 2017 
declined 74.5% from 2016.  However, the bilateral trade value was estimated to 
increase by 10.5% year-on-year to $2.55 billion due to a rise in China’s non-
sanctioned exports.63  The data shows that despite the enforcement of U.N. 
sanctions by China, the North Korean economy has not been adversely affected 
and thus that they have not been effective. 
 　 In the face of Pyongyang’s two tests of ICBMs in July, Beijing also played an 
active role in adopting Resolution 2371.  The new resolution was worked out as a 
result of several weeks of painstaking negotiations between Washington and 
Beijing.  Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi mentioned that his government would 
be committed to enforcing the new sanctions, even though “it will mainly be 
China paying the price for implementing the resolution” due to its close economic 
relationship with North Korea.64  Beijing started to implement the new sanctions 
under Resolution 2371 on August 15 when China’s Ministry of Commerce issued 
import bans imposed on coal, iron, iron ore, lead, and seafood from the North.65 
 　 Engagement with China on which the new policy puts emphasis coincides with 
the realist stance favoring an engagement policy based on carrot-and-stick 
diplomacy.  To induce Beijing to play a more active role in resolving the North 
Korean nuclear problem, President Trump reportedly offered Chinese President Xi 
Jinping more favorable trade terms in return for Beijing’s assertive role in 
addressing it at their summit meeting in April 2017.66  In addition, as mentioned 
above, U.S. policy makers have reaffirmed that their administration will not seek 
regime change, the collapse of the regime, an accelerated reunification, and an 
excuse to send the U.S. military north of the 38th parallel.67  This “Four Nos” 
policy is considered as an incentive to induce Beijing, which has been worried 
about the instability and consequential collapse of the communist regime, to rein 
in North Korea. 
 　 On the other hand, Washington used sticks to pressure Beijing to rein in 
 63.  KOTRA, “A Surge in Chinese Trade with North Korea? A Strong Refutation by the 
Chinese Government,” (in Korean), Global Market News, http://news.kotra.or.kr/user/
globalBbs/kotranews/10/globalBbsDataView.do?setIdx=247&dataIdx=160557. 
 64.  “China says willing to pay the price for new N. Korea sanctions,”  Reuters , August 8, 
2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-china-idUSKBN1AO011. 
 65.  “China to ban North Korean coal and iron imports from August 15th,”  The Hankyoreh , 
August 15, 2017, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/806876.html. 
 66.  “Trump Says He Offered China Better Trade Terms in Exchange for Help on North 
Korea,”  The Wall Street Journal , April 12, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-says-he-
offered-china-better-trade-terms-in-exchange-for-help-on-north-korea-1492027556. 
 67.  Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, “Remarks at a Press Availability,” U.S. Department of 
State, August 1, 2017, https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/08/272979.htm. 
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Pyongyang.  As a stick, late in June, the U.S. Treasury Department took a punitive 
measure toward China by imposing secondary sanctions on a shipping company, a 
bank, and two individuals from China because of their financial ties to North 
Korea’s nuclear program.68  On August 22, it also imposed new secondary 
sanctions against ten companies and six individuals from China and Russia for 
their aiding North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs through their trading. 
Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material, one of the largest importers of North 
Korean coal, was among the Chinese companies subject to sanctions.69  After the 
U.N. Security Council decided to impose the strongest sanctions against the 
communist regime on September 11 in response to its sixth nuclear test, the U.S. 
House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Rep.  Ed Royce has reportedly asked 
the U.S. government to impose secondary sanctions on 12 large Chinese banks as 
part of stringent measures to cut off North Korea’s access to the international 
financial system.  And U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin threatened to 
impose additional sanctions on China if it fails to implement the new U.N. 
sanctions.70  Moreover, President Trump’s new administrative order on September 
21, whose main purpose was to apply sanctions against foreign financial 
institutions related to significant trade deals with North Korea, is interpreted as 
aiming to pressure China to restrict its banks from conducting transactions with 
North Korea.  The measure taken by the U.S. Treasury Department on September 
26 to designate eight North Korean banks and twenty-six North Koreans in their 
overseas branches on its sanction blacklist is also believed to be intended mainly 
to curb Chinese financial transactions with North Korea. 
 　 Fourth, the policy of strategic accountability calls for strengthening defense 
measures and military readiness through the close cooperation with South Korea 
and Japan in order to deter and respond to North Korean provocations, such as the 
deployment of the THAAD in South Korea, the deployment of U.S. strategic 
assets to the Korean Peninsula, and the enhancement of joint military exercises.71 
This policy is also consistent with a realist prescription of promoting mutual 
security cooperation with allies in order to effectively cope with hostile nations. 
In particular, in July 2016, the U.S. and South Korea had agreed to deploy the 
 68.  “U.S. Sanctions Chinese Entities With Financial Ties to North Korea,”  The Atlantic , 
June 29, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/us-sanctions-chinese-
entities-over-ties-to-north-korea/532317/. 
 69.  “China demands U.S. immediately withdraw N. Korea sanctions, warns they will 
damage ties,”  The Washington Post , August 23, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
china-bristles-at-us-imposed-sanctions-on-north-korea-trade/2017/08/23/32bfba3c-87ba-11e7-
9ce7-9e175d8953fa_story.html?utm_term=.935ab63da557. 
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THAAD system at the earliest possible date in order to intercept North Korea’s 
ballistic missiles.  In response to North Korea’s test-launching four ballistic 
missiles on March 6, 2017, the next day the U.S. military began deploying the 
THAAD system in its new missile defense base in Seongju, some 300 kilometers 
south of Seoul in South Korea.  Furthermore, in the face of increasing security 
threats from North Korea which were caused by its two tests of ICBMs in July 
and its sixth nuclear test of detonating a hydrogen bomb on September 3, the U.S. 
military completed the temporal deployment of a THAAD battery consisting six 
rocket launchers and a powerful X-band radar on September 7.72 
 　 In the meantime, the THAAD deployment has faced strong opposition from 
Beijing.  Chinese officials have conceived of it as undermining the security 
interests of China because they are worried about the possibility that the U.S. may 
utilize THAAD’s radar in South Korea to detect and track China’s own missile 
systems so as to weaken the nuclear defense posture of the Chinese military.  In 
addition, they doubt whether the U.S. intends to bring South Korea through the 
THAAD deployment into its missile defense system in Northeast Asia to contain 
China in the future.73  In response to Beijing’s opposition, U.S. officials stress that 
installing the THAAD system in South Korea is “defensive preparations against 
the acute threat of military actions directed against the U.S., our allies and other 
nations,” and thus they criticize China’s demand not to deploy THAAD as 
“unrealistic.”74  The THAAD issue has been one of the obstacles that the U.S. and 
South Korea have to overcome through diplomacy in engaging with China to 
pressure North Korea to change its provocative behavior.  As a reprisal move 
against the THAAD deployment in South Korea, Beijing unofficially imposed 
sanctions on South Korean firms operating in China and restricted Chinese tourists 
to South Korea, which has led to tensions in the bilateral relations. 
　 At the end of September, South Korea and China unexpectedly reached an 
agreement to restore their relations through high-level talks. 
　 At that time, in return for Beijing’s concession on the already deployed 
THAAD system, Seoul gave it the assurance of the following “three no’s”: no 
additional THAAD deployment; no participation in the U.S. missile defense 
system and no formation of a trilateral alliance with the U.S. and Japan.75 
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Nevertheless, the issue has not yet been fully resolved. This is because Beijing has 
demanded a guarantee that the THAAD system won’t technically infringe upon its 
security interests, while Seoul has asked for lifting sanctions and restrictions. 
Further bilateral talks are expected to be held to address the issue.  Moreover, the 
U.S. military has regularly staged a massive show of force against North Korea by 
deploying its strategic assets, such as aircraft carriers, nuclear-power submarines, 
strategic bombers, fighter jets, and troops, to the Korean Peninsula for joint 
military exercises with South Korean forces in order to bolster the combined 
defense posture and military readiness to cope with North Korean provocations. 
 　 Finally, the policy of strategic accountability seeks engagement with North 
Korea on condition that it ceases provocative actions, such as nuclear tests and 
missile test-launches.  Following this policy stance, Secretary of State Tillerson 
and other U.S. high-level officials have reiterated that Washington is willing to 
start negotiations with Pyongyang and that North Korea needs to stop its missile 
launches and nuclear weapons tests for negotiations to begin.  When the U.N. 
Security Council decided to impose the strongest sanctions ever against North 
Korea’s sixth nuclear test in September, U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley stated that 
the U.S. is not looking for war and that Pyongyang has “not yet passed the point 
of no return.”76  State Department officials also reiterated Washington’s intention 
to “solve this issue through diplomacy” if the communist regime shows “an 
interest in serious engagement,” such as the cessation of its provocative actions.77 
These remarks indicate the U.S. government’s willingness to conditionally engage 
with North Korea.  While it did not indicate any specific agenda of the 
negotiations, the Trump Administration suggested that they would deal with 
economic aid and security assurance for the North Korean regime.78  This policy 
stance is also consistent with the realist prescription of engagement based on 
carrot-and-stick diplomacy.  Nevertheless, Washington has largely depended on 
the pressure strategy because of Pyongyang’s recurrent provocative actions 
without any hint of change. 
 　 To sum up, the Trump Administration’s policy of strategic accountability is 
considered as largely deriving from the realist school of thought.  Its emphasis on 
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pressure and sanctions is in line with the realist prescription of taking punitive 
measures against hostile regimes, as a part of carrot-and-stick diplomacy, in the 
face of their recurrent non-cooperation and provocations.  The policy of 
strengthening deterrence and military readiness in cooperation with South Korea 
is also consistent with the realist logic favoring close mutual cooperation with 
allies in order to effectively cope with hostile nations.  On the other hand, the 
administration has sought multilateral diplomacy and sanctions conducted through 
the U.N. Security Council.  Its focus on multilateral approach utilizing the U.N. is 
in accord with the liberal internationalist prescription. 
 Conclusion 
 　 Top officials of the Trump Administration reiterated that the Obama 
Administration’s policy of strategic patience failed to stop North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program and thus that they decided to end the policy.  Nevertheless, the 
Trump Administration’s new policy of strategic accountability has been similar to 
the previous policy of strategic patience in some aspects.  First of all, as examined 
above, both policies are similar in that they were derived from the blending of 
realism and liberal internationalism.  Their focus on the pressure strategy of 
imposing diplomatic pressure and sanctions is consistent with the realist 
prescription of taking punitive measures as a part of carrot-and-stick diplomacy in 
case of recalcitrant non-cooperation and provocations.  Their emphasis on 
strengthening security cooperation with the ROK is also in accordance with the 
realist logic favoring cooperation with U.S. allies to effectively deal with hostile 
nations.  At the same time, their focus on multilateral economic sanctions against 
North Korea through the U.N. was to follow the liberal internationalist 
prescription. 
 　 In their some specific components, both policies are similar.  First, they are the 
same for the reason that they all set “complete, verifiable and irreversible 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” as an ultimate policy goal.  Recently 
some U.S. policy experts suggested a policy option that the U.S. would accept a 
nuclear North Korea and pursues a policy of containing it by means of nuclear 
deterrence because they considered its denuclearization as unrealistic in view of 
recent advances in its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.79  Nevertheless, high-
level officials in the Trump Administration, like those in the Obama 
Administration, have rejected that option and stressed that they would “never 
recognize North Korea as a nuclear state.”80 
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 　 Second, both policies are similar in that they focused primarily on a strategy of 
pressure and sanctions, rather than one of engagement and negotiations, mainly 
because the communist regime continued to take provocative actions to conduct 
nuclear and missile tests, while refusing to return to the negotiation table.  The 
policy of strategic accountability has followed the same pattern as the policy of 
strategic patience during the second term of the Obama Administration 
demonstrated: applying multilateral step-up sanctions against North Korea 
through the U.N.  Both policies have in common that Washington did not actively 
attempt to engage with Pyongyang without offering any concrete terms and 
incentives for denuclearization because of the communist regime’s persistent 
refusal to change its nuclear-armed policy and get back to the negotiation table. 
Both policies only set forth conditional engagement that the U.S. would negotiate 
with North Korea only if it indicates an intention to give up its nuclear program 
by stopping nuclear and ballistic missile tests. 
 　 Third, both policies are alike because they were opposed of such a policy of 
regime change through military means as favored by neo-conservatives.  Officials 
and experts in both administrations seemed to conceive of it as infeasible because 
of the expected risks of military options aiming at regime change, such as North 
Korea’s large-scale retaliation, the possibility of triggering a full-scale war, 
massive civilian casualties, and China’s backlash and possible intervention.81  For 
the same reasons, the South Korean governments have consistently opposed 
taking such military actions.  Fourth, both policies are similar in that they 
emphasized and demanded China’s role in pressuring North Korea to halt its 
nuclear program and return to denuclearization negotiations.  Finally, the policy of 
strategic accountability has in common with the policy of strategic policy that 
both of them included such measures as strengthening deterrence capabilities and 
military readiness in cooperation with South Korea and Japan to cope with North 
Korean threats and provocations. 
　 Meanwhile, the policy of strategic accountability is different from the policy of 
strategic patience in other aspects.  First, they had different priorities in dealing 
with nuclear challenges the U.S. faced.  The Trump Administration has given a 
top priority of its foreign and national security policy to the problem of North 
Korean nuclear and missile programs and tried to tackle it “with more energy and 
urgency.” In contrast, the Obama Administration reportedly placed its first priority 
on resolving the Iranian nuclear problem because it needed to exert too much 
effort and energy to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program which had already 
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advanced enough to produce small nuclear weapons.82  Second, The Trump 
Administration has been more assertive than the Obama Administration in pushing 
China to fully implement U.N. sanctions and exercising pressure on North Korea 
in that the former has pursued an engagement policy based on incentives as well 
as secondary sanctions on China.  In particular, the Trump Administration has 
stepped up substantial pressure on China by launching secondary sanctions 
designed to contain or cut off its companies and banks’ transactions with North 
Korea.  
　 Third, the North Korea policy of the Trump Administration is different from 
that of the previous administration in that the former has seriously taken into 
consideration military options, such as the rotational deployment of U.S. strategic 
assets near the Korean Peninsula, the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear 
weapons onto the Korean Peninsula, and a limited military strike on North 
Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities.83  
　 The main reason why the Trump Administration has considered military 
options earnestly is because the communist regime is estimated to be approaching 
the final stage of developing ICBMs with nuclear warheads targeted at the U.S. 
mainland.  Since North Korea conducted the sixth nuclear test on September 3, 
high-level officials in Washington have reiterated the warning that the U.S. will 
resort to military options if diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions fail to 
curb North Korean nuclear and missile tests.
　 Finally, the Trump Administration’s pressure policy has been more 
comprehensive and intensive than that of the Obama Administration. As the 
former’s name, a policy of “maximum” pressure, indicates, the Trump 
Administration has more actively expanded and increased multilateral and 
unilateral sanctions on the Kim Jung-un regime with an explicit goal of isolating 
its economy. In particular, the Trump Administration has stepped up pressure 
through a series of unilateral economic sanctions in less than a year. To date, 
nevertheless, it is uncertain how effective such a pressure policy of the Trump 
Administration will be in compelling North Korea to change its provocative 
behavior and return to the negotiation table because it still takes more time for the 
policy to take effect.
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